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This project undertakes an empirical analysis in credit risk modeling using a data sample
representative of bank lending to the Czech corporate sector. A rating system is constructed
using a proprietary database (Creditreform) that provides a solvency index for a large number of
Czech firms. Several methods for the calibration and validation of a rating system are described
and tested in practice. On the basis of a representative portfolio for Czech industries, systemic
predictions of regulatory and economic capital are obtained and compared. The methodologies
formulated by the latest Consultative Document of the NBCA (April 2003) and by the Credit
Metrics and CreditRisk+ models are applied. The main contributions of this project can be
briefly summarized as follows: (a) it shows in an applied manner that input data problems in
credit risk modeling can be overcome, (b) it sheds light on regulatory issues that are gaining
increasing relevance, and (c) it outlines the most important features of two credit risk models.
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Nontechnical Summary
The banking sector worldwide faces an increasing need to address and put in practice modern
practices in the credit risk area. Banks are concerned with credit risk management techniques
partly because of the new regulations of the Basel Committee. At the same time, increased
competition is forcing banks to develop and implement internal processes in order to find the
optimal mix between taking risks, maximizing returns and creating their own capital provisions.
This need will be felt even more strongly in countries with transition economies where the
implementation of credit risk management procedures is at an incipient phase and where the lack
of input data is in many cases severe.
An essential requirement in credit risk management is the creation of a rating (scoring) system.
While rating (scoring) systems may prove useful for a large array of bank activities, they are
becoming increasingly relevant for regulatory and economic capital provisioning. In this paper a
rating system is constructed for the Czech corporate sector using a proprietary database
(Creditreform) that provides a solvency index for a large number of Czech firms. Although the
methodology for constructing the solvency index and the main features of the Creditreform data
set are briefly presented, the main emphasis is put upon the construction and validation of the
rating system. The reliability of the method used to construct the rating system is tested through a
set of statistical measures of the power of the model (power curves and Gini coefficients) and of
the predictive power of the model (Alpha- and Beta-errors, accuracy ratios and information
entropy ratios).
A natural extension of the paper is to compare regulatory and economic capital estimations
according to different credit risk modeling approaches. We apply two credit risk models
(CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+) and the latest Consultative Document of the NBCA (April 2003).
These capital estimations reflect a “macro” lending view in the sense that all loans granted by
banks active in the Czech Republic are aggregated at the industry level and all other required risk
inputs are estimated at this level.
Our results can be seen as an overall empirical assessment of the New Basel Capital Accord and
of several credit risk models analyzing the bank credit conditions in the Czech economy. The
quantitative results of the paper can be briefly summarized:
•  Several validating tests show that our rating system displays a similar performance to
rating systems constructed on the basis of Creditreform data in Austria or Germany.
•  The regulatory capital estimated according to the IRB approach of the New Basel Accord
is in the range estimated by the credit risk models at a 95% confidence level. Among the
credit risk models implemented, the CreditMetrics model predicted the lowest economic
capital values. However, this outcome is due to several simplifications made in order to
circumvent the non-availability of input data into this model.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   3
1. Introduction
The successful application of the New Basel Capital Accord and credit risk models is significantly
dependent on the availability of the required input data. Although ratings are fundamental inputs,
the empirical estimation of other elements is equally important for the practical implementation of
these methodologies. In this paper we construct a rating system using Czech corporate data and
provide other estimates of the primary inputs needed in credit risk modeling. Subsequently, the
implications of the constructed rating system for the estimation of regulatory and economic
capital are examined.
Recent regulatory norms that are contained in Basel documents view ratings as good quantifiers of
bank clients’ default risk and as an essential tool in estimating banks’ regulatory capital. For
expositional purposes, ratings provided by well-known rating agencies (Standard and Poor’s,
Moody’s – KMV) are used in these documents. The major drawback of this approach is that these
ratings cover an insignificant share of the market, especially in the corporate sector of the
developing countries. To avoid this problem, regulators purport to allow banks to build their own
models for constructing internal rating systems. In principle, these models are scoring-based and
employ client-specific accounting and payment default information, with model-specific default
probabilities being assigned to scoring groups. Although banks’ internal rating systems can
overcome the problem of non-availability of ratings, other types of problems may arise.
Regulators will have to adopt and test the eligibility of a large variety of modeling approaches.
Moreover, the outcomes of these models will not necessarily provide a consistent view of the
default trends of the corporate sector as a whole.
For this reason, we would like to undertake a quantitative analysis that offers a fundamental, even
incipient, macro perspective of bank lending to the corporate sector in the Czech Republic. Our
analysis is supported by data obtained from an external agency (Creditreform), which has
monitored the Czech corporate sector over the transition period. The Creditreform dataset depicts
the general trends in default behavior within the non-financial corporate sector and is a reliable
starting point for the construction of a rating system for Czech non-financial firms. Further on, we
restrict our attention to Czech industries (according to the NACE classification) by estimating the
credit risk-required inputs at the industry level.
A natural extension of the paper is to compare regulatory and economic capital estimations
according to different credit risk modeling approaches. In this sense we apply two credit risk
models (CreditMetrics, CreditRisk+) and the latest Consultative Document of the NBCA (April
2003). The primary goal is to shed light on the practical implementation of these methodologies
and on several theoretical constructs facilitating the estimation of the required input data. By
analyzing a loan portfolio that reflects the macro structure of bank loans in the Czech Republic at
the end of 2002, we are able to answer questions that are relevant from the supervisory point of
view:
•  What is the rapport between regulatory and model-based estimations of default risk capital?
•  Is there an acceptable confidence level in the VaR-based methodology where economic
capital approaches regulatory capital?4   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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•  Does the application of the NBCA look likely to be perceived as burdensome from the Czech
banks’ perspective in terms of regulatory capital provisioning?
•  Is the estimated economic capital likely to differ significantly depending on the chosen credit
risk model?
Since these questions are answered from a “macro” lending view, their generalization at the
individual bank level may be meaningless. Portfolio composition effects and the peculiarities of
estimating the risk inputs into credit risk modeling by different banks may induce significant
differences from our results for individual banks.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a brief literature review. Chapter 3
describes the Creditreform agency and the dataset used. Chapter 4 contains the construction,
calibration and validation of the rating system for Czech firms. The estimation of the remaining
input prerequisites and risk capital according to different methodologies is contained in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions. The detailed quantitative results are contained in the
Appendix.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   5
2. Literature Review
This project draws intensively on similar studies conducted using Creditreform data in Austria.
Schwaiger (2003) describes several techniques for the construction of a rating system in this
context, such as the cohort, logit/probit and Bayesian approaches. In all these cases specific
methods are proposed to group the firm population into separate classes (according to the
Creditreform solvency index) and estimate the class-specific probabilities of default (PDs).
Schwaiger also examines several analytical tools able to assess the performance of a model, such
as power curves, Gini coefficients, Alpha- and Beta-errors, accuracy ratios, etc. We include a
brief account of these performance indicators when validating our rating system.
General guidelines and techniques for the validation of a rating system are predominantly
researched by rating agencies. Moody’s – KMV, for example, makes available a wealth of
documents dealing with this topic. Stein (2002) and Sobehart et al. (2000) examine the two basic
dimensions of a model validation process – power and calibration. Power reveals the ability of a
model to discriminate among good (non-defaulted) and bad (defaulted) firms. Calibration
indicates how well a model’s predicted PDs correspond to the real outcomes. It is also shown in
these papers how the performance statistics of a rating system are affected by the sample used in
the model’s construction. These authors recommend a walk-forward approach that combines out-
of-time and out-of-sample testing (the data is pooled from year to year and the model is adjusted
step by step) or bootstrapping techniques that consist in numerous re-samplings from the sample
under investigation. These general principles of rating system validation are tested in practice and
are described in a series of documents emphasizing the performance of the Moody’s – KMV
model for rating private firms (RiskCalc) in several European countries.
Migration matrices are important inputs into credit risk modeling. These matrices assess the
degree of mobility among the rating classes of a rating system over a selected time period (the
common assumption is one year). In most cases, the estimation of these matrices rests upon
historical frequencies of default and rating migrations that are averaged class by class over a
reasonably long time period. The aim is to capture an entire business cycle in order to isolate the
influence of particular phases in the business cycle on firms’ default behavior. Besides the
difficulty of estimating migration matrices dependent on the particular phase of the business
cycle, it is the procyclicality argument that justifies the use of average migration matrices. For
example, if higher migration probabilities of downgrading are used during a recession, the
resulting bank tendency to restrict credit may push the recession even further. There are several
studies that examine the procyclical effect of the business cycle on rating migrations (see Bangia
et al., Corcostegiu et al., and Nickell et al.).
In general, rating systems are assumed to display Markov properties, meaning that the distribution
of ratings of an obligor evolves between the consecutive moments t and t+1 according to the
rule ( ) ( ) M t R 1 t R ⋅ = + . Here  ( ) t R  is the ratings distribution of an obligor at time t and M is the
migration matrix. In general, M is assumed to be time homogeneous or constant over time. The
time homogeneous property of the migration matrices is tested in several studies on account of
matrix norms and metrics (see Jafry and Schuermann, Schuermann and Jafry, Bangia et al.) that
rely on the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the migration matrices. Additionally, these studies
propose a counterpart to the cohort way of estimating migration matrices. If rating migrations are
available in continuous time, i.e. through the year and not only at the beginning and end of the6   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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year, it is possible to estimate migration matrices using homogeneous and non-homogeneous
duration methods (see Lando and Skodeberg and Schuermann and Jafry). However, the lack of
data makes the applicability of these methods redundant in our case.
Another essential input into credit risk modeling, especially in the case of mark-to-market credit
risk models like CreditMetrics, is the discount factors used in loan valuation. The basic
assumption made here is that the valuation of different loans has to account for the risk
characteristics of different bank obligors and for the time-value of money. In general, the risk
premia are extracted from market prices of traded debt instruments (bonds) and rely on explicit
pricing formulas of these instruments (see Arvantis et al., Jarrow et al.). In this paper the
estimation of the term structure of credit spreads is the outcome of empirical application of the
Markov-based methodology of Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997).
The regulatory guidelines of the New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA) and their subsequent
amendments are contained in a series of Consultative Documents and Quantitative Impact Studies
released by the Basel Committee between 2001 and 2003. In terms of credit risk modeling, the
most detailed descriptions of the relevant models are contained in the technical documents
accompanying the release of these models. A comparative illustration of the most prominent
credit risk models is provided in Crouhy et al. (2000) and Derviz and Kadlcakova (2001). In this
paper we briefly touch upon the most important features of the Basel II regulations and credit risk
models and put a particular emphasis on their practical implementation.
3. The Empirical Project
3.1 Creditreform and its Solvency Index
Creditreform is a business information service and debt collection organization with 176 agencies
throughout Europe. Creditreform was present in the Czech Republic from 1890 to 1948 and was
re-established in 1991. It has been operating for more then ten years in the Czech Republic and
provides a stable history of its solvency index for a large number of Czech enterprises.
We had been searching for a partner with sufficient empirical data for the project to help predict
the impact of Basel II and current credit risk models on regulatory and economic capital. The
Creditreform solvency index makes it possible to estimate the capital adequacy changes under the
New Basel Capital Accord affecting future credit conditions upon implementation in 2006.
Creditreform was chosen as a partner for this project because it provides a stable data history of
more than five years for its solvency index. This solvency index represents an independent sample
of Czech credit ratings that could not have been achieved by pooling the data of banks. Banking
systems today lack information about the future development of companies whose credit
applications have been refused in the past, especially if they have not been watched as clients.
This information is needed for validating the prognostic value of the rating system used.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   7
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3.2 Construction of the Solvency Index
Based on a model created in Germany which has been successfully applied in several countries all
over Europe, the solvency index was adjusted for Czech enterprises. The Creditreform solvency
index can be described on a scale from 100 to 600 risk points. The value 100 is the best, while the
value 600 represents the state of legal default. In the intermediate range, the solvency index is
defined as follows:
•  From 100 to 190 risk points  - very good creditworthiness
•  From 191 to 240 risk points  - good creditworthiness
•  From 241 to 310 risk points  - medium creditworthiness
•  Around 400 risk points - weak creditworthiness, liquidity problems
•  500 risk points - insufficient creditworthiness or payment behavior
•  600 risk points - business connections refused, bankruptcy or legal default
Creditreform obtains information from debt collection, supplier information and its own research
and forms an opinion about the payment behavior of a company. Balance sheet information and
research similar to a credit application fill the financial and structural criteria. Subsequently, a
credit opinion and the final solvency index are calculated. Each of the fifteen criteria is evaluated
individually and assigned risk points in one of the six classes. A private limited company, for
example, is always evaluated with 16 risk points in the fourth class because of its limited liability.
The algorithm used to calculate the solvency index is weighted in the following way:
1.  Financial data 25%
2.  Payment behavior 20%
3.  Credit opinion 25%
4.  Structural data 15%
5.  Industry and size 15%
With a weight of 25% the credit opinion and financial data are the strongest factors in this kind of
rating system. These factors can be weighted differently by company size, legal form or industry.
The way in which the Creditreform solvency index is calculated is shown in the following
example for two public limited companies.
Example A
Legal form: s.r.o.
Line of business: Construction
Age: 12 years
Business development:  constant (class 3)
Order book: good (class 2)8   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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Payment behavior: within agreed targets (class 2)
Credit opinion: business connections acceptable (class 2)
This is a Czech construction company with an annual turnover of around CZK 30 mil., with 15
employees and with the s.r.o. legal form (similar to ltd.). The payment behavior of the company is
good. In previous years there has been only one case of debt collection with this enterprise,
meaning that the debt was paid after the first reminder.
Example B:
Legal form: s.r.o.
Line of business: Construction
Age: 12 years
Business development:  constant (class 3)
Order book: stagnating (class 4)
Payment behavior: partly out of agreed targets (class 4)
Credit opinion: business connections not denied (class 4)
This is also a construction company that has a turnover of around CZK 250 mil. and 150
employees. The researcher knows that the company often pays its debt only after several
reminders are sent to the company.
The Creditreform researcher evaluates the solvency index in the following way (simplified):
Table 1: Creditreform Solvency Index Calculation
Example A:
Classes
Risk factors Weight % 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mode of payments 20 40
Credit opinion 25 50
Business development 8 24
Order book 7 14
Legal form 4 16
Line of business 4 12
Age of company 4 8
Turnover/employee 4 12
Equity 4 8
Capital turnover 4 12
Payment behavior of the company 4 8
Shareholder structure 4 12
Customers’ payment behavior 4 8
Number of employees 2 8
Turnover 2 6
Total 100   136 78 24    
Solvency index 238Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   9
Example B:
Classes
Risk factors Weight % 1 2 3 4 5 6
Mode of payments 20 80
Credit opinion 25 100
Business development 8 24
Order book 7 28
Legal form 4 16
Line of business 4 12
Age of company 4 12
Turnover/employee 4 12
Equity 4 8
Capital turnover 4 12
Payment conduct of the company 4 16
Shareholder structure 4 12
Customers’ payment behavior 4 8
Number of employees 2 4
Turnover 2 2
Total 100 2 20 84 240   
Solvency index 346
3.3 Data Description
Creditreform currently contains specific information on 77,000 Czech companies in its database.
This database is enriched with information collected about every newly registered company in the
Czech commercial register (where about 320,000 companies are now represented). When
selecting the firm sample we applied the criterion of a turnover of at least three million Czech
Koruna to avoid small businesses and trade licenses. After removing inactive companies, this
coverage closely represented the active Czech corporate sector.
After a serious data cleaning of blank fields, double entries, defaults at the beginning and new
companies at the end of the time scale with the aim of getting the most accurate credit
information, the final sample size of Czech corporations for the period 1997–2002 with a
Creditreform solvency index in 2002 was 25,735. In the end we got the following picture of the
Creditreform solvency index over 6 years and nearly 70,000 observations.
Table 2: Creditreform Solvency Index Data Records 1997–2002
Year /
Solvency index 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
observations
100–199 627 607 574 678 491 438 3,415
200–299 5,929 6,003 7,744 10,024 6,553 4,522 40,775
300–399 3,474 3,003 4,206 5,305 3,258 1,970 21,216
400–499 121 72 102 101 35 14 445
500 24 184 233 234 193 115 983
600 2 219 633 764 719 815 3,152
Total 10,177 10,088 13,492 17,106 11,249 7,874 69,98610   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
This provides us with a data set of the solvency index between 1997 and 2002, from which we
will derive a default structure over five transition periods as a base for our rating system.
Default Definition
Default was defined as the state in which a company received a solvency index from Creditreform
of 500 or 600. This definition is not entirely consistent with the default definition used by banks.
In banks’ models of default risk, liquidity plays the central role. Default is thus triggered by the
incapacity or unwillingness of firms to honor their debt obligations within a well-defined time
period. Even if liquidity and the payment discipline of a firm were important factors for the
construction of the Creditreform index, they played only a partial role. It was not possible to
disentangle the role of liquidity from the aggregate index. Thus, our definition of default
emphasized the firms’ failure to redress their economic fundamentals rather than strictly focusing
on the risk of cash shortfalls. A default definition fully consistent with the one used by banks
could have been achieved by recourse to the Credit Register of the Czech Republic. However, this
represented an equally weak alternative due to the short time history of the data available in the
Czech Credit Register.
By our definition, an annual default event occurred if the solvency index of the company migrated
from a value strictly below 500 to a value of 500 or 600 in a one-year period. Table 3 shows the
number of enterprises and the annual default structure as evidenced in the Creditreform database.
Table 3: Number of Companies and Annual Default Structure
Transition period 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 Total
Non-defaulted
companies 5,470 7,816 9,778 7,420 6,380 36,864
No. of Defaults 297 472 315 371 360 1,815
No. Of companies 5,767 8,288 10,093 7,791 6,740 38,679
Default rate 5.15% 5.69% 3.12% 4.76% 5.34% 4,69%
4. The Creation of a Rating System for Czech Corporations
4.1 The Construction of the Rating System
In our understanding a rating system consists of classes of homogenous obligors in terms of
default expectations and a set of default probabilities associated with these classes. To devise a
rating system, we were looking for the threshold values of the Creditreform index that, for each
pair of consecutive years, optimally separated the pool of firms in distinct classes. In terms of the
previous discussion, optimality meant that the threshold selection method satisfied the conditions
of power (with the default probabilities clearly distinguishing among the classes) and model

















































We had to keep track of several basic requirements in devising the rating classes:
1.  the PDs should follow an increasing order as one moves from the best to the worst class,
2.  the PD structure should display an exponential shape, thus increasing disproportionately faster
within the worst classes, and
3.  high concentrations of firms in a single class should be avoided.
In practice it was difficult to satisfy all these criteria. The distribution of the cumulative default
for a representative
2 pair of years (see Figure 1) shows that defaults were rather linearly
distributed over the entire index range and defaults started at rather low values of the index.
Therefore, from the outset one can expect that the class-specific PDs will not reach the
exponential shape characteristic of other standard rating systems (S&P, Moody’s – KMV ). This
figure also suggests that compared with some standard rating systems ours would confer
significantly higher PDs to the good classes.
Figure 1: Creditreform Solvency Index Versus Cumulative Annual Default from 2001 to 2002
These facts are partially explained by the notion of default employed. Our definition of default
was closer to bankruptcy rather than default on specific payments and focused more on the ability
of the issuers to honor their overall debt and not particular financial debt instruments. While
bankruptcy is to a great extent influenced by financial and economic factors (high leverage, low
liquidity, low profitability), factors that are not linked with economic fundamentals might also be
strong in transition economies in influencing bankruptcy. It is likely that these external factors
limited the ability of the Creditreform index to place defaults predominantly at the lower end of
the index scale.
                                          
2 For the other pairs of years the cumulative default curves were very similar to the one considered here.12   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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The algorithm used to find the threshold values of the index defining the classes had to optimally
exploit (according to points 1 to 3 above) the given degree of “convexity” of the cumulative
curve. We considered the minimum number of classes requested by the NBCA (seven for non-
default and one for default). In the first class were included the best firms (with solvency index
values roughly in the 100–150 range). The threshold value defining the first class was the lowest
value of the index defining a firm sample that excluded any default event in the following year.
Thus, by construction the first class was assigned a PD of zero. The thresholds defining the
remaining six non-default classes were estimated in such a way that (a) the PD of a given class
was reasonably higher than the PD of the previous class and (b) the PD of that class over the
remaining threshold scale was minimized. The eighth class contained defaulted firms and was
associated with a PD of one.
To define the rating classes the index scale was divided as follows. First, all firms were ordered
increasingly according to the Creditreform index in the first period. Let us denote by  1 k n −  and
k n the index values determining the k
th class, with k ranging from two to six. For each pair of
years the threshold value  1 n defining the first class was the index value strictly lower than the
value associated with the first default. The remaining threshold values were determined
recursively. Let us introduce the following additional notations:
•  ij D  – the number of defaults in the firm sample defined by the i
th and j
th values of the
index, i, j = 100, 499
•  i N  – the maximum firm rank corresponding to the i
th value of the index.
Having determined the index value for class k-1 ( 1 k n − ),  the index value for class k ( k n )
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We followed the cohort approach in estimating the class-specific annual default probabilities. This
means that the probability of default characterizing a certain class was determined as the number
of defaults occurring during the subsequent one-year period divided by the total number of firms
in that class at the beginning of the period.
This “unconstrained” algorithm of constructing rating classes produced a mixed result in the sense
that the default probabilities and the threshold values defining the classes significantly varied
from year to year. A convenient way to homogenize the results was to pool the data from all years
and then to apply the algorithm for defining classes to this pooled dataset (thus evaluating a
homogenized PD structure). Subsequently, for each individual pair of years we looked for
threshold values defining classes that minimized the distance between the class-specific PDs and
the homogenized PD structure. More precisely, denoting by  h
i PD  the default probability of class i
determined on the basis of the pooled data (with i=2,7), the class-specific threshold values and
class-specific PDs were estimated recursively for each pair of years by finding the minimumCredit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   13
h
i i PD PD min − .
Figure 2 summarizes the main features of the resulting rating classification (class-specific PDs
and firm concentration in each class) between 2001 and 2002. This outcome is representative for
the other pairs of years, as illustrated by Table 4. Table 4 contains annual default probabilities for
the non-defaulted rating classes for the entire six-year period.
Figure 2: Class-specific PD Structure and Firm Concentration in each Class (2001–2002)
Table 4: PDs over all Transition Periods (%)
Rating Class 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 2.94 1.02 0.73 1.33 1.14
3 3.46 3.72 2.39 2.04 1.97
4 3.90 4.71 2.50 3.25 4.21
5 5.31 5.09 3.00 5.52 6.04
6 8.89 13.20 9.38 9.10 10.38
7 16.67 23.53 14.81 25.81 18.75
This eight-class rating system respects the Basel II requirements. The main objective was to
devise a rating system with increasing probabilities of default from the best to the worst class, and
this objective was fulfilled. The PD structure started from zero in the first class and, as a rule,
doubled when switching between adjacent rating classes. The firm distribution in the individual
classes also avoided strong concentrations of firms in single classes. The PD structure obtained by
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Figure 3: An Increasing PD Structure
4.2 Validation of the Rating System
The two dimensions of a rating system validation are its power and its ability to match predicted
and real default events. The tools used in the validation are particularly relevant in a comparative
context since, in general, numerous methods of constructing a rating system are available and the
credit analyst has to select the optimal one. In this subsection we describe a set of measures that
quantify the “goodness” of the model utilized to create a rating system and present their estimates
when applied to our specific case. We first discuss the notions of power curves and Gini
coefficients. These are statistical measures of the power of a model. The discussion is
accomplished with an account of the measures used to assess the predictive power of a model,
such as Alpha- and Beta-errors, accuracy ratios and information entropy ratios.
In statistical terms, the power of a model is assessed by means of power curves and Gini
coefficients. A power curve is a graphical representation showing on the horizontal axis the
percentage of firms (x) ranked from the worst to the best scoring (rating) and on the vertical axis
the percentage of default events “produced” by the firm sample determined by 0 and x over the
considered risk horizon. The logic behind such a representation is that likely candidates for
default in the future are firms that have a bad scoring (rating) today and that the likelihood of
getting new defaults decreases as one moves closer to the sample of good firms. At one limit
stands the random model that uniformly distributes defaults over the entire sample. The power
curve of the random model is the first diagonal. At the opposite limit stands the perfect model that
includes all the defaults within an infinitesimal move away from zero on the horizontal axis. A
strong model displays a power curve strongly biased towards the northwestern corner of the
figure.
The power of our rating system relied upon and was constrained by the power of the Creditreform
index. In other words, we could not outperform Creditreform in distinguish among good and bad
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Figure 4: A Representative Power Curve (2001–2002)
Gini Coefficients
A Gini coefficient is a measure closely related to the notion of the power curve. It is defined as the
ratio between the area under the power curve of a model and the area under the power curve of the
perfect model. According to this definition, Gini coefficients take values between 50% and 100%.
A Gini coefficient of 50% describes the random model and a Gini coefficient of 100% is
representative of the perfect model. Table 5 at the end of this section contains the Gini
coefficients and the Conditional Information Entropy Ratio values for the individual pairs of years
of our data. The relative medium values of the Gini coefficients suggest that our model’s
performance in terms of power belongs to the middle range.
Conditional Information Entropy Ratio
The information entropy is defined as the amount of additional information a lender would require
to determine whether a certain obligor will default or not. In mathematical form it is equal to (see
Sobehart et al., 2000):
[] ) PD 1 log( ) PD 1 ( PD log PD H0 − ⋅ − + ⋅ − = ,
wherePD denotes the probability of default of the obligor and  ) log(⋅  is the logarithm in any base
1.
This function reaches its maximum, i.e. the bank would need the largest amount of additional
information about the obligor when deciding whether to approve the loan or not, when the
probability is  2 / 1 . This case represents a state of absolute ignorance, since both possibilities are
equally likely for the bank.
                                          
1 Conventionally, the natural logarithm is used, though the logarithm in base 2 is more convenient to work with
because in this case the information entropy lies between 0 and 1. The choice of base does not affect the final
result.16   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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In our model we have a set of rating classes  } 7 ,..., 2 , 1 { = R  corresponding to the Creditreform
solvency index. The conditional entropy measures the information about the probabilities of
default and non-default for a specific class  j R  in the following manner:
[ ] )) R ( PD 1 log( )) R ( PD 1 ( ) R ( PD log ) R ( PD ) R ( H j j j j j − ⋅ − + ⋅ − = ,
where  ) R ( PD j  is the probability that the issuer defaults given that the rating class is j R .
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where  ) ( i R w is the frequency of rating class i R  and  ) | ( i j R R P  is the migration probability of
moving into class  j R  conditional on current class  i R  .
The Conditional Information Entropy Ratio (CIER) compares the information entropy related to
the overall default rate in the sample to the information entropy after we introduce a model, i.e.
split the issuers into a number of rating classes and derive the probability of default for each of
them. That is, we measure the uncertainty associated with the default frequency in the firm sample
and compare it to the uncertainty left over after taking into account the predictive power of the
model. The CIER is one minus the ratio of the latter to the former, that is:
0 C H / H 1 CIER − =
If CIER is 0 the model has no relevance. In our case, for the pooled dataset we got a CIER value
of 29%, which means that the rating system we created clarifies 71% of the information compared
to the case in which no rating system would exist. Table 5 compares the values of the Gini
coefficients and the CIERs over the entire period studied.
Table 5: Gini Coefficients and CEIRs over all Transitions (%)
Transition period / Ratio 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02
Gini Coefficient 60.3 60.1 60.1 63.2 61.9
Information Entropy Ratio 80.5 78.0 84.3 81.6 79.8
Conditional Information Entropy Ratio 19.5 22.0 16.7 19.4 20.2
Alpha and Beta Errors
Alpha and Beta errors are the equivalent of the Type I and Type II errors often used in statistical
and econometric tests. In the context of a rating system validation, an Alpha error is defined as the
proportion of firms that were ex ante classified as good but defaulted, relative to the number of ex
post non-defaulted firms. A Beta error is the ratio of firms that were ex ante classified as bad but
did not default, relative to all firms that ex post defaulted. This logic can be extended to particular
rating classes. Figure 5 shows the distribution of solvent and insolvent firms ex post.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   17
Figure 5: Ex Post Analysis of (In)solvent Enterprises
Figure 6 separates the good firms from the bad ones. It shows that most of the solvent enterprises
belonged to the positive rating classes while insolvent companies were predominantly in the
default class. To identify the Alpha and Beta errors in the rating system it is necessary to compare
the number of firms predicted by the model as good (in rating classes 1 to 7) with the real defaults
in the next period. This represents the Alpha Error, which is a measure of the default risk.
Analogously, one can consider all enterprises classified as bad by the model and compare them to
the real outcome of defaulted firms. All those who did not default represent the Beta error. The
Beta error is divided over all non-defaulting companies, resulting in a relatively small number,
which can be seen in the following figure.





















solvent insolvent18   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
Table 6 shows the distribution of Alpha and Beta errors over the entire period. Like the Gini
coefficient it shows the discrimination power of the rating system, which is visualized as the area
between both figures. The Alpha error for the insolvent companies is around 42%. These
companies were previously rated as good and subsequently defaulted. If they had been given
credit this would have resulted in a loss. The Beta error (0.27%) represents only administration
costs or lost business, since it refers to those companies which were refused credit in the past but
would have otherwise been creditworthy. The first period 1997/98 cannot be taken into account as
it is the first transition period and does not include previous defaults for verification. The Alpha
error is decreasing over time overall, which is positive for identifying default risk.
Table 6: Alpha / Beta Errors over transitions





In terms of Alpha / Beta errors, our model displayed a slightly higher Alpha error (42% compared
to 39%) and a significantly lower Beta error (0.27% compared to 9%) than in Austria (see Table
7). However, this comparison is only a rough benchmark for the quality of our model, since the
input data were slightly different. Not ignoring the fact that the data had a longer history and
better quality in Austria, we can nevertheless conclude that the rating system built upon the Czech
version of the Creditreform data is close to international standards.















The next step is to construct the one-year migration matrices. The elements situated on the rows
of these matrices represent the percentage of firms that, starting from a certain rating class at the
beginning of the period, migrate to another rating class at the end of the one-year period. The
assumption made by the cohort approach is that the historical frequencies of migration are good
approximations of the implicit migration probabilities. Appendix A1 contains the migration
matrices associated with our rating system. In general, the probability mass of the migration is
concentrated on the first diagonal, meaning that migrations become less likely as the distance
between classes becomes higher. Appendix A1 also contains the average of the five migration
matrices (cell-by-cell average) over the six-year period.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   19
In the literature, rating systems are typically assumed to display Markov (stochastic) properties. In
this sense the probability distribution R(t) of the credit ratings of an obligor is assumed to follow a
Markov process, i.e. the history of R(t) is described by the relation  ( ) ( ) M t R 1 t R ⋅ = + , where M
is the migration matrix among the rating classes. Under the Markov assumption, migration
matrices are supposed to be time homogeneous (constant in time). The time homogeneous
assumption is an extremely useful property, since, if it holds, it allows the computation of multi-
period migration matrices as the power of the one-year migration matrix. The extent to which
migration matrices satisfy the time homogeneity property in our rating system is evaluated by
means of several matrix metrics that assess the discrepancy among matrices. These metrics are
called mobility indices. They have often been referred to in the literature in connection with the
time homogeneity property of the migration matrices of a rating system
2.
Given two migration matrices A and B whose elements  n , 1 j , i b and a j , i j , i =  sum to one for each





























































The first two metrics are the equivalent of the standard Euclidian distances defined in the 
n R
space. They aggregate into an overall measure the cell-by-cell distances between the elements of
the two matrices. The third measure captures differences in the convergence rates towards the
steady states of the probability distributions R governed by the two transition matrices. The fourth
measure reflects differences in the average probability of migration as defined by Jafry and
Schuermann (2003). Their matrix norm is constructed as the average of the singular values of the
mobility matrix  A
~
A




, I A A
~
= ′ − = , A = the migration matrix, I = the identity




~′ . This norm describes an “average” propensity of migration of the rating system from the
current rating classes to different rating classes within the considered period. The closer to zero
these metrics are, the more likely it is that the time homogeneity assumption is valid.
Computing the values of these metrics it is possible to compare the “distance” between annual
migration matrices and their period average. Figure 7 depicts the results.
                                          
2 However, to our knowledge these mobility indices do not constitute a formal test statistic by themselves.














Figure 7: Comparison between Annual Migration Matrices and their Period Average
Based on visual inspection, the migration matrices are similar according to the L1 and L2 metrics,
with the migration matrix from 1997 to 1998 being an outlier. The E metric reveals that
differences in convergence rates between individual migration matrices and their period average
are insignificant (the E line has small fluctuations around zero). The degree of mobility of the
annual migration matrices relative to their period average decreased between 1997 and 2001 but
increased slightly between 2001 and 2002. Thus, the average tendency of ratings to change over a
one-year period (rather than remain in the current state) lost pace from 1997 to 2001 but changed
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5. Credit Risk Modeling for Czech Loans
5.1 Introduction to Credit Risk Modeling
The release of a series of consultative documents and quantitative impact studies by the Basel
Committee and several commercial credit risk models by renowned financial institutions has
reinforced the awareness of the banking sector of the necessity to measure and control the risk
associated with banks’ lending operations. The publication in 2001 of the New Basel Capital
Accord and three consequent impact studies triggered an intensive dialog among regulators and
bankers worldwide. The aim is to formulate an optimal set of norms and regulations meant to
become standard practice in bank capital provisioning against credit risk by 2006. At the same
time, credit risk models have raised constant interest within the banking industry because these
models allow sensitive measurement of default risk at the portfolio level. The most prominent
credit risk models developed and to a certain extent already applied by the banking industry are
Credit Metrics (JP Morgan), CreditRisk+ (Credit Suisse Financial Products), KMV (Moody’s –
KMV) and CreditPortfolioView (McKinsey’s & Company).
In what follows, the methodologies applied in this paper are briefly presented: the Internal Ratings
Based (IRB) approach as formulated by the latest Consultative Document of the NBCA (April
2003), and the Credit Metrics and CreditRisk+ models. The main goal of the paper is to reflect on
the applicability of these methodologies and not to offer a comprehensive theoretical description.
For this reason the remaining part of this section sketches the most important steps that are
essential in estimating the risk capital in each considered case.
5.1.1 The New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA)
The regulatory guidelines referring to credit risk assessment and capital budgeting are exposed in
the NBCA under two main headings, the standardized approach and the Internal Ratings Based
(IRB) approach. Irrespective of the approach selected, banks are supposed to categorize all their
exposures within a well-defined range of categories and to apply category-specific regulatory
rules
3. The contribution of credit risk-related regulatory capital to an overall minimum capital
requirement (additionally incorporating capital for market and operational risk) is identical under
the two approaches.
The standardized approach relies on rating systems provided by external agencies (Moody’s –
KMV, S&P) and on risk weights that are calibrated to the rating classes of these rating systems.
The IRB approach specifies concrete regulatory capital formulas permitting banks to use their
own estimations of the required input data, including among them banks’ internal ratings. If a
bank applies the IRB approach, it has to estimate the following risk inputs at the obligor (asset)
level: the probability of default (PD), an estimate of the loss incurred if default occurs (Loss
                                          
3 The following claim categories are considered under the standardized approach: sovereigns, non-central
government public sector entities (PSEs), multilateral development banks, banks, securities firms and corporates.
Considered under the IRB approach are sovereign, bank, corporate, retail, equity and purchased receivables
exposures.22   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
Given Default or LGD), the loan exposure (EAD) and an effective maturity (M). Specific
eligibility criteria are provided in the regulatory documents that allow banks to estimate these risk
inputs based on an internal process. Additionally, under the IRB approach two alternative
procedures are mentioned, the foundation approach and the advanced approach. Under the
foundation approach, banks may derive their own estimates only for the PDs
4, with all other risk-
input estimations conforming to the regulatory rules. Under the advanced approach, banks can use
their own estimates for all the required risk inputs.
The initial IRB methodology for corporate exposure (January 2001) was significantly modified in
the recent Consultative Document of the NBCA (April 2003). The current formulation entails the
application of the following algorithm when computing a risk-adjusted value of a bank asset:
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•  Computing a maturity adjustment coefficient (b):
()
2 05898 0 08451 0 b ln(PD) ⋅ − = . . ,
•  Computing a capital requirement coefficient (K)
5:
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•  Estimating the risk-weighted asset value:
EAD K 5 12 RW ⋅ ⋅ = . .
The regulatory capital represents 8% of the sum of the risk-weighted assets. Our computations
conformed to the foundation approach of the IRB by employing our own estimates for the PDs
and determining all other risk inputs according to the regulatory rules. We used an LGD value of
45% (as required for senior claims on corporates), an effective maturity of 2.5 years and an EAD
equal to the face value of the loans (the amount legally owed to the bank).
                                          
4 The only restriction that applies in this case is that the PDs are bounded from below by the 0.03% value,
meaning that PDs below this value (according to the bank’s internal rating system) must be replaced by the
0.03% value for regulatory capital estimation purposes.
5 N(x) and G(x) denote the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal distribution and its inverse,
respectively. It should also be mentioned that the PD value must be expressed as whole numbers in the
computation of R. For example, a PD of 2.5% should enter the R formula as 2.5 and not as 0.025. On the
contrary, in computing the coefficients b and K one must use PD values in the traditional sense, thus as numbers
between 0 and 1.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   23
5.1.2 CreditMetrics
CreditMetrics is a typical mark-to-market model in which changes in asset value are induced by
credit migrations and defaults taking place over the risk horizon. Therefore, two elements play a
crucial role in the theoretical construction and practical implementation of this model: a loan
valuation method dependent on credit ratings changes and a tool that generates random changes in
credit quality over the risk horizon. While the second target is fulfilled by recourse to Monte
Carlo simulations, the first one draws insights from a Merton-type model of the firm’s value and,
more generally, from the dynamic asset pricing theory.
Based on Merton’s theory, the arrival time of a default event is defined as the first time when the
borrowing firm’s asset value falls below the outstanding debt obligations of the firm
6. This
principle is extended to accommodate changes in rating quality, by assuming that certain asset
threshold values can be defined that mark the change from one rating class to another, once the
firm’s asset value falls below the corresponding threshold values. To simplify the analysis,
CreditMetrics links the calculation of these threshold values to the migration matrices made
available by rating agencies. The way in which CreditMetrics operates this mapping is based on
the observation that the probability mass of the migration matrices is usually distributed on the
first diagonal, and dies out at a high speed as one moves towards more distant ratings. This means
that the most likely credit event for the firm is to preserve the current rating over the risk horizon.
The adjoining rating migrations are less likely and the likelihood of further changes decreases
further. Then the idea is to link the probabilities of realization of these credit quality changes to
the standard normal distribution. This is shown in Figure 8 below.
Figure 8: The Partition of the Standard Normal Distribution and the Threshold Values
Source: CreditMetrics Technical Document.
                                          
6 More precisely, CreditMetrics works with percentage changes in asset values or asset returns.24   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
The figure shows the partition of the region under the standard normal distribution in distinct
zones, whose areas equal the migration probabilities of the BBB rating class according to the S&P
rating system. The middle zone characterized by the largest area reflects the probability of
preserving the BBB rating. The next step is to observe that these zones are well delimited and can
be mapped in a one-to-one manner into a set of real numbers (the Z values on the x axis on the
figure). These Z values are called threshold values and are computed with the help of the inverse
of the standard normal cumulative function.
The calculation of the threshold values represents the key tool in implementing Monte Carlo
simulations. The idea is to draw random numbers from the standard normal distribution (one for
each asset), to compare them with the rating class-specific threshold values and to assess what
rating migrations these numbers would suggest. This procedure is complicated to some extent in
the portfolio context, since rating migrations for different obligors are, as a rule, correlated.
Performing independent random draws from the normal distribution would make no sense in this
context. The problem, however, can be easily solved on the basis of Cholesky factorization or
singular value decomposition methods that are usually available in the current statistical software
programs.
An important aspect of the CreditMetrics model is the loan valuation. Depending on the credit



























=   (1)
where r and F are the loan interest and face value, and dt
g′ are the discount factors for the years 1
to T, applicable to the rating class g' (here T is the maturity of the loan). In this specification it is
assumed that the present rating changes from g to g' over the one-year period. In the case of
default the present value of the loan is computed as the product of the face value of the loan and
the recovery rate. The portfolio value is the sum of the individual loans’ valuations.
A particular difficulty in (1) is posed by the estimation of the discount factors d entering bank
loans’ valuation. This estimation relies on risk neutral probabilities whose existence (and
uniqueness) is conditional on the assumption of complete markets and no-arbitrage conditions.
Even if these general assumptions are disregarded in practice, the estimation of the discount
factors is still problematic, since it requires information on the price of risk in the loan market.
Since loans are non-traded debt instruments, the price of risk can be at most proxied. At least from
a theoretical point of view, a few approaches for the estimation of the discount factors have been
developed, one of which will be explained in more detail in Subsection 5.2.
Random draws of real numbers replicate random changes in credit quality. Contingent on the
rating migration simulated, loans are re-evaluated and the portfolio value is computed. This is the
principle of the Monte Carlo simulation. Random drawings of real numbers are performed a large
number of times (preferably ten thousand times or more). The corresponding portfolio values
generate the empirical portfolio distribution. Economic capital estimations can then be performed
in a manner to be presented in Subsection 5.3.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   25
5.1.3 Credit Risk+
CreditRisk+ is a default mode model that borrows intensively from the actuarial models used in
insurance economics. Default mode means that the credit standing of a certain obligor over the
risk horizon can reach only two states: default and non-default. CreditRisk+ adopted the reduced-
form approach to modeling default risk by calibrating random default and loss events to standard
statistical distributions. Even if default events at the individual obligor level are not directly
modeled, default probabilities represent a compulsory input into the CreditRisk+ model and must
be estimated by the credit analyst.
The approach followed by CreditRisk+ is to “homogenize” the pool of risky loans by grouping
them into classes (“bands” in the CreditRisk+ terminology) with similar risk characteristics. The
deciding factor in performing this classification is the so-called common exposure at the band
level. In this sense, credit exposures are scaled down by a selected unit of exposure and obligors
with similar exposures (after rescaling and rounding to the nearest integer) are grouped together.
Two distributions are relevant in the analysis. The distribution of default events at the band level
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with the expected number of defaults given by m and with a standard deviation  m . The second
distribution is the one related to the entire portfolio loss, i.e. portfolio losses expressed as
multiples of the unit of exposure related to their probabilities of realization. The derivation of both
distributions rests upon the construction of a probability generating function and its statistical
properties. In the latter case a recursive formula is derived that estimates the probabilities that loss
equals multiples of the unit of exposure. The estimation of the economic capital is performed on
the basis of the portfolio loss distribution thus derived in a manner to be presented in Subsection
5.3.
CreditRisk+ allows two types of generalizations in the basic set-up, a risk analysis extending over
a multi-year period and a risk analysis with variable default rates. In the latter case diversification
effects are captured in the model by incorporating the sensitivity of the obligors to systemic risk
factors (“sectors” in the CreditRisk+ terminology). The average default rate of a certain sector is
assumed to follow a Gamma distribution, which transforms the random variable describing the
number of defaults at the sector level into a negative binomial distribution. The same reasoning as
in the basic case applies for the derivation of the portfolio loss distribution in this case.
We applied the CreditRisk+ model with a multi-year default structure and with all the exposures
assigned to a single sector (the general economy). Default rates at horizons longer than one year
were determined by multiplying the one-year migration matrix by itself n times (n is the number
of years) and then examining the elements situated in the last column of the resulting matrices.26   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
5.1.4 The Czech Loan Portfolio
The Czech economy has undergone dramatic changes and dynamic development since the 1989
revolution. The corporate sector is now mostly privatized and Czech banks are currently mainly
foreign-owned. The banking system has stabilized after a series of bank bankruptcies that took
place at the beginning of the transition period. However, even if default rates have been
decreasing for years, credit risk still represents a major risk for bank lending operations to
businesses. Classified loans (for which payment has been delayed for more than 30 days) as a
percentage of the total credit volume fell from 32% in 1999 to 16% in 2002.
In what follows we construct a representative portfolio for bank lending to corporates in the
Czech Republic. The assets of the portfolio are represented by bank credits to Czech industries
(according to the NACE classification). For this reason the terms assets and industries will be
used interchangeably in the rest of the paper. In principle, defining the portfolio is tantamount to
estimating all the industry characteristics that represent the necessary inputs in the different credit
risk methodologies approached in this paper. A quick reference to the required input data is
contained in Table 8.
Table 8: Input Data Required by Different Approaches
NBCA CREDITMETRICS CREDITRISK+
•  Ratings and PDs
•  Credit exposures
•  Maturities
•  Recovery rates
•  ratings and PDs/migration matrices
•  credit exposures
•  maturities
•  recovery rates
•  interest rates on loans
•  asset return correlations
•  discount factors (credit spreads)
•  credit exposures
•  PDs
•  PDs’ volatilities
The remaining part of this section examines our data sources and the methodologies applied to
estimate the required model inputs.
5.1.5 Ratings
To assign ratings at the industry level we computed historical default rate frequencies and their
period averages at each industry level. The statistical significance of the average default rates was
assessed according to the methodology proposed by Cantor and Falkenstein (2001). More
precisely, following their notation let us define:
•  t , i n as the number of firms in industry i at time t,
•  t , i d  as the number of defaults in industry i at time t,
•  t i PD ,  as the default rate in industry i at time t,
•   =
t
t , i i n N  as the number of issuer-years in industry i,
•   =
t






PD =  as the average default rate over the entire period in industry i.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   27
Assuming that the underlying (true) default rate  i p of industry i is constant in time, Cantor and
Falkenstein show that the empirical default rates  t i PD , and  i PD are approximately normally
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, respectively.
If the underlying default rate is not constant in time, due either to fluctuating macroeconomic
conditions or to idiosyncratic reasons at the industry level, then the average default rate for
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, where σ  is the standard
deviation of a macroeconomic shock affecting the economy.
Standard deviations at the industry level were computed assuming both constant and variable true
default rates. In the latter case σ  was approximated by the standard deviation of the default rate
of the entire sample of firms over the period 1997–2002. In the final portfolio we selected those
industries that displayed standard deviations of the default probabilities of less than 2%.
Additionally, we eliminated those industries for which the sample contained a very small number
of firms.
The results are reported in Appendix A2. The elements of that table contain annual default rates at
the industry level, the standard deviations of the average default rates and the rating class
assignment of each industry. Designated in bold numbers are the industries whose average default
rates seemed reliable and thus were considered as assets of the portfolio. By comparing the default
rates at the industry level (the average) with the default rates situated in the last column of the
average transition matrix, we assigned the individual industries to rating classes. For example, if
the average PD of a given industry was 4.14% (agriculture), the industry was assigned to the
rating class 5, since its PD belonged to the interval defined by the representative PDs of the fourth
and fifth classes.
5.1.6 Credit Exposure
We aggregated the loan volumes granted by all Czech banks to non-financial firms. These loans
are reported as a stock at the end of each month in the SUD database of the Czech National Bank.
We sorted the loans according to industry destination, currency denomination (Czech crowns, US
dollars and euro) and the maturity classification used by the Czech National Bank (less than 1
year, 1–4 years, 4–5 years, more than 5 years). We aggregated only loan volumes in the
classification range from one to four, with non-performing loans (loss loans or loans in the fifth
category) being neglected. The aggregate bank credit exposure respecting this structure was
estimated at the end of 2002 and is shown in Appendix A3.
5.1.7 Interest Rates
Loan interest rates are not classified according to industry in the databases of the Czech National
Bank. For this reason we used data made available by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the
Czech Republic. We computed an implicit interest rate at the NACE level defined as the ratio
between interest expenditure and total bank loans at the industry level at the end of 2002.28   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
Unfortunately, these estimations provided only a general indication of the loan interest rates and
were not differentiated according to loan maturity. For those industries for which relevant data
was missing we used the figures available at the next level of aggregation (for example, data was
available as an aggregate over NACE 50, 51 and 52 but not at the level of each of these industries)
or the economy-wide average (NACE 1). The results are displayed in Appendix A4.
5.1.8 Recovery Rates
No explicit measure of the loans’ recovery rates at the industry level is publicly available. For this
reason we assumed a recovery rate of 55% for all industries. This figure is compatible with the
45% LGD value considered in the regulatory case
7.
5.1.9 Asset Return Correlations
Asset returns at the industry level were proxied by the corresponding producer price indices and
correlations among these indices were computed. The implicit assumption made was that an
adverse shock affecting a certain industry would induce a fall in the corresponding producer
prices. In principle, measuring correlations among sectoral equity returns would have been
preferable, since equity indices offer a better image of the trends in asset returns at the industry
level. The main drawback was that equity indices were not available for some of the industries
included in the portfolio. Additionally, the feeble firm representation on the Czech Stock
Exchange could have depicted a biased picture of the real productivity trends of particular
industries anyway.
Each price index was divided by the PPI to eliminate systemic influences that could have inflated
the correlations. Monthly price indices that covered the period January 1995 – September 2003
were obtained from the Czech Statistical Office. Since such price indices were not available for
the industries NACE 52, 63 and 73 these industries were not further considered. The industries
NACE 65 and 67 represented the financial sector, so they were also ignored in the computations.
Correlations among price indices at the industry level are contained in Appendix A5.
5.1.9 Discount Factors (Credit Risk Spreads)
The approach of Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull was implemented to estimate the term structure of
credit spreads. Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull formalize changes in rating quality as a Markov chain
described by a time-homogeneous migration matrix.
Consider an n-class rating system  } D ,..., 2 , 1 { R =  (the last class D denoting default) and the
associated time homogeneous migration matrix M whose elements  ij M represent the probability
of migration between the rating classes i and j. If the life horizon of the loan [0, T] is divided into
m intervals [t, t+1], t = 0,…,T-1 over which changes in credit quality may occur, the risk premia at
                                          
7 The recovery rate is 1-LGD.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   29
time t are the rescaling factors  () t i π  that transform the physical migration probabilities  ij M  into
the corresponding risk-neutral migration probabilities  () 1 t , t Mij + ∗ :
() ( ) ij i ij M t 1 t , t M ⋅ = + ∗ π ,    i, j = 1,n, i = j
In Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull the estimation of the risk premia is done recursively. The spot
values  () 0 i π  are given by
() () ()
() ( ) iD
0
0
i M 1 1 , 0 B
1 , 0 B 1 , 0 B
0
⋅ δ − ⋅
−
= π
where  () 1 , 0 B0 and  () 1 , 0 Bi  are the “prices” of default-free and risky loans respectively, δ is the
recovery rate and  iD M is the default rate of the rating class i. At the time horizon t the risk premia
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where  () t , 0 M∗  is the risk neutral migration matrix between time 0 and t defined by the recursive
formula  () ( ) ( ) ( ) [] I M 1 t I 1 t , 0 M t , 0 M − ⋅ − π + ⋅ − = ∗ ∗ .
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull also derive a closed form solution for the credit spreads
() () ( ) iD i
i M t 1 1
1
ln t S
⋅ π ⋅ δ − −
= .( 3 )
In our case the “prices” of default free and risky loans in (2) were computed as
() () t ) r (
i
t r 0 it t t e t , 0 B and e t , 0 B ⋅ + − ⋅ − = = ϕ ,  t = 1, 2,…,6
where  t r was the risk free rate (1-year PRIBOR) and  it ϕ  were the interest rate charges on risky
loans requested by some Czech banks at the end of 2002. Here t represents the maturity of the
loans and i the rating class.
The credit spread estimations in the Czech market based on (3) are depicted graphically in
Appendix A6
The Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull model constitutes a convenient theoretical technique for the
estimation of the credit spreads in the Czech bank loan market. The main deficiency of this
estimation was related to the quality of the input data. The interest rate charges on risky loans
were calibrated to banks’ internal rating systems and these rating systems were not consistent with
the one we used. Moreover, the probabilities of default characterizing our risky classes (the sixth30   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
and seventh classes) were significantly higher than the default probabilities accepted by the Czech
banks when granting loans to corporate clients. Since interest charges on loans with such risk
characteristics were not available as real data we had had to perform several calibrations
8.
Additionally, since data was obtained from a small number of banks, the possibly of depicting a
biased picture is very high.
The estimated model inputs are summarized in Table 9. This represents the 33-asset portfolio on
which the aforementioned methodologies were applied.
















1 – Agriculture 4.14% 5 14.76 16.30% 6 55%
14 – Mining other 2.86% 4 1.47 6.23% 6 55%
15 – Manufacture of food products and
beverages
7.51% 6 22.24 8.65% 6 55%
17 – Manufacture of textiles 4.22% 5 6.37 9.27% 6 55%
18 – Manufacture of wearing apparel;
dressing and dyeing of fur
4.11% 5 2.49 11.88% 6 55%
20 – Manufacture of wood and of
products of wood
7.73% 6 2.05 7.76% 6 55%
21 – Manufacture of pulp, paper and
paper products
3.56% 4 7.03 6.79% 6 55%
22 – Publishing, printing and reproduction
of recorded media
4.17% 5 4.59 7.81% 6 55%
24 – Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
2.98% 4 14.15 9.18% 6 55%
25 – Manufacture of rubber and plastic
products
3.39% 4 7.88 9.90% 6 55%
26 – Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products
4.90% 5 14.14 11.49% 6 55%
27 – Manufacture of basic metals 6.07% 6 5.49 10.29% 6 55%
28 – Manufacture of fabricated metal
products
4.36% 5 8.21 12.63% 6 55%
29 – Manufacture of machinery and
equipment
4.72% 5 12.92 11.14% 6 55%
30 – Manufacture of office machinery and
computers
5.41% 6 0.17 1.66% 6 55%
31 – Manufacture of electrical machinery
and apparatus
2.59% 3 5.67 15.56% 6 55%
32 – Manufacture of radio, television and
communication equipment and
apparatus
3.49% 4 0.82 19.12% 6 55%
                                          
8 More precisely, for the last two rating classes (associated with default probability values of 10% and 20%) we
assumed interest rate charges over the risk free rate of 50% and 200%, respectively. This was an artificial way to
reflect the fact that Czech banks refuse, as a rule, to grant loans to corporate customers with default probabilities
in this range. However, these assumptions affected the estimation of the credit spreads in the last two non-
defaulted classes. Since credit risk spreads are essential for CreditMetrics, its estimated economic capital values
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33 – Manufacture of medical, precision
and optical instruments, watches and
clocks
3.65% 4 1.19 8.80% 6 55%
34 – Manufacture of motor vehicles,
trailers and semitrailers
1.29% 2 7.33 28.29% 6 55%
36 – Manufacture of furniture 5.12% 6 4.63 7.87% 6 55%
37 – Recycling 3.37% 4 0.64 14.73% 6 55%
40 – Electricity, gas, steam and hot water
supply
2.80% 4 24.90 13.96% 6 55%
41 – Collection, purification and
distribution of water
0.00% 1 2.75 3.06% 6 55%
45 – Construction 5.58% 6 9.81 9.83% 6 55%
50 – Sale and repair of motor vehicles and
cycles and fuel
4.45% 5 9.58 9.63% 6 55%
51– Wholesale trade 5.70% 6 56.53 9.63% 6 55%
55 – Hotels and restaurants 5.79% 6 2.21 7.03% 6 55%
60 – Land transport; transport via
pipelines
2.39% 3 16.44 16.30% 6 55%
64 – Post and telecommunications 1.89% 3 10.67 16.30% 6 55%
70 – Real estate 8.99% 6 36.69 11.05% 6 55%
71 – Renting of machinery and equipment 4.80% 5 13.01 11.05% 6 55%
72 – Computer and related activities 1.45% 3 3.04 11.05% 6 55%
74 – Other business activities 5.59% 6 21.47 11.05% 6 55%
5.2 Regulatory and Economic Capital Estimations
Table 10 illustrates the algorithm discussed in 5.1.1 for the estimation of regulatory capital.





1 4.14% 14.76 0.12 0.07 0.12 22.37
14 2.86% 1.47 0.12 0.09 0.10 1.79
15 7.51% 22.24 0.12 0.06 0.17 47.45
17 4.22% 6.37 0.12 0.07 0.12 9.76
18 4.11% 2.49 0.12 0.07 0.12 3.75
20 7.73% 2.05 0.12 0.06 0.17 4.45
21 3.56% 7.03 0.12 0.08 0.11 9.74
22 4.17% 4.59 0.12 0.07 0.12 6.99
24 2.98% 14.15 0.12 0.09 0.10 17.61
25 3.39% 7.89 0.12 0.08 0.11 10.61
26 4.90% 14.14 0.12 0.07 0.13 23.66
27 6.07% 5.49 0.12 0.06 0.15 10.39
28 4.36% 8.21 0.12 0.07 0.13 12.83
29 4.72% 12.92 0.12 0.07 0.13 21.15
30 5.41% 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.30
31 2.59% 5.67 0.12 0.09 0.09 6.47
32 3.49% 0.82 0.12 0.08 0.11 1.12
33 3.65% 1.19 0.12 0.08 0.11 1.6732   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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34 1.29% 7.33 0.12 0.12 0.06 5.41
36 5.12% 4.63 0.12 0.07 0.14 7.94
37 3.37% 0.64 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.86
40 2.80% 24.90 0.12 0.09 0.10 29.84
41 0.00% 2.75 0.15 0.49 0.01 0.43
45 5.58% 9.81 0.12 0.06 0.14 17.69
50 4.45% 9.58 0.12 0.07 0.13 15.15
51 5.70% 56.53 0.12 0.06 0.15 103.23
55 5.79% 2.21 0.12 0.06 0.15 4.06
60 2.39% 16.44 0.12 0.09 0.09 17.88
64 1.89% 10.67 0.12 0.10 0.08 10.03
70 8.99% 36.69 0.12 0.05 0.19 86.40
71 4.80% 13.01 0.12 0.07 0.13 21.50
72 1.45% 3.04 0.12 0.11 0.06 2.42
74 5.59% 21.47 0.12 0.06 0.14 38.77
Total RWA 573.73
Regulatory Capital = 0.08 · Total RWA 45.90
The two discussed credit risk models use the Value at Risk (VaR) paradigm to perform economic
capital estimations. The logic behind Value at Risk is that economic capital provisioning must
cover large but unlikely losses resulting from the joint default (or migration to low states) of a
large number of obligors in the portfolio. Despite working with different distributions (portfolio
value distribution in CreditMetrics and portfolio loss distribution in CreditRisk+), both models
provision for unexpected losses by estimating the magnitude of the so called p-quantiles relative
to the expected value (loss) of the portfolio.
In terms of losses, a p-quantile represents the threshold value that the portfolio loss would exceed
with a 1-p probability (usually p is expressed in percentages). In terms of the portfolio value
distribution, a p-quantile represents the threshold value below which the portfolio value would fall
with a 1-p probability. Formalizing, the p-quantiles can be expressed as
) p 1 ( F quantile p
1 − = −
−
if the model estimates the portfolio value distribution, and as
) p ( F quantile p 1 − = −
if the loss distribution is estimated. Here F is the cumulative function of the portfolio value (loss)
distribution. In other words, the p-quantiles are the values where the area under the left tail of the
cumulative distribution (right tail if the loss distribution is modeled) is equal to (1-p)% and p%,
respectively.
Economic capital is defined as the difference between the p-quantile and the expected loss in
models that construct the portfolio loss distribution. In models that estimate the portfolio value
distribution, economic capital is the difference between the average portfolio value and the p-
quantile. In both cases, however, one can be confident with a p% probability that the economic
capital would cover losses defined by the p-percentile. It is the task of the bank’s credit risk






















large losses by the maintained capital. The common practice is to focus on values ranging from
95% to 99.9%. As a rule, banks might give preference to the 95% value, while the 99% and higher
values represent the more conservative regulatory option.
The two distributions generated by the two credit risk models in our case are depicted in Figures 9
and 10.
Figure 9: Portfolio Value Distribution According to the CreditMetrics Model













95%-percentile Economic capital at
95% confidence
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Table 11 summarizes our estimations of regulatory and economic capital.





95% 99% 99.5% 99.9%
NBCA (IRB) 45.90
CreditMetrics 30.74 49.81 53.96 64.89
CreditRisk+ 45.12 70.39 80.32 101.95
Several comments can be made on the basis of these results. First, the predicted economic capital
exceeds regulatory capital at the 99% and higher confidence levels, irrespective of the credit risk
model selected. It appears that at a systemic level the regulatory guidelines of the NBCA would
not impose capital cushions in excess of the predictions of the credit risk models. This result may
be explained by the fact that the foundation approach of the IRB homogenized to some extent the
regulatory capital computations. In terms of risk characteristics, only the probabilities of default
and the exposures at risk were allowed to vary across assets, while the maturities and the recovery
rate values were determined according to the regulatory rules and took the same value for all
assets. On the other hand, the credit risk models employed additional asset-specific values for the
risk inputs required (for example, loan interest rates and discount factors). If the differences
among individual assets in terms of their risk characteristics are effectively modeled, the portfolio
value is more volatile. Consequently, more risk would call for more capital provisioning.
The fact that the regulatory capital is comparable with the models’ predictions at a 95%
confidence level seems to support the probable preference of banks for implementing economic
capital budgeting at this level. Stricter regulatory rules favoring higher p-values are likely to be
perceived as burdensome from banks’ viewpoint. However, this conclusion strongly depends on
the assumption that the “average” bank portfolio in the Czech market has a structure similar to the
macro portfolio that we constructed. In practice this assumption is unlikely to hold. Banks may
vary substantially in terms of appetite for risk, with some banks manifesting a particular
preference for investment grade and other banks for speculative grade customers. The portfolio
composition effect is reinforced if the dependency on systemic risk factors, represented by the
Czech industries in our case, has a structure at the bank level different than the one presented
here. This fact may have profound consequences for the estimation of asset return and default
correlations and implicitly for the default distribution at the portfolio level. An additional
departure from our conclusions may be induced by fact that banks have estimation methods for
the required risk parameters at the client level that differ significantly from ours. For example, the
scoring methods developed by many Czech banks to estimate their clients’ probabilities of default
take into account different risk factors and risk weights than those that we considered. The direct
bank-client relationship is also conducive to a more precise estimation of some client-specific risk
characteristics such as loan interest rates, maturities and recovery rates. In this regard we had to
make very loose simplifying assumptions.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   35
Finally, the different credit risk models’ estimations of economic capital displayed obvious
differences
9. CreditMetrics estimated the lowest values of economic capital at all confidence
levels. We think that this outcome was to a great extent determined by the way in which the
discount factors were estimated for the last two rating classes. Although differences among
the different credit risk models’ estimations were determined, no definitive conclusion should
be drawn. Considerably more research in this direction is required, especially aimed at
obtaining more robust estimations of the required input data.
6. Results and Conclusions
This project accomplished several goals. The most far reaching one was to put to the test
modeling approaches that are gaining increasing relevance in credit risk modeling: the calibration
and validation of a rating system and the estimation of economic and regulatory capital. The
applied nature of the project had rewarding implications. Besides a better grasp of issues with a
demanding theoretical content, we were able to directly compare alternative solutions to questions
that do not have an easy answer. At least as important are the incipient model estimations
performed with specific Czech data.
One of the primary goals was to construct a rating system for the Czech corporate sector reflecting
systemic default trends. This study was conducted using a solvency index provided by a
specialized credit information agency (Creditreform). Further, we established links to the bank
credit information contained in the databases of the Czech National Bank. The construction of the
rating system reinforced the conclusion that a trade-off may be reached between the quality and
quantity of the required input data in credit risk modeling. Several validating tests showed that our
rating system displayed relatively similar performance parameters compared to the rating systems
constructed on the basis of Creditreform data in Austria or Germany.
A natural extension for the constructed rating system was to compare regulatory and economic
capital estimations according to two credit risk models (CreditMetrics and CreditRisk+) and the
latest Quantitative Impact Study of the New Basel Capital Accord. The majority of these
methodologies require estimates of the risk characteristics of bank obligors that are partially a by-
product of a rating system. The risk capital estimations suggested that the IRB approach of the
New Basel Accord would require capital cushions in the range estimated by the credit risk models
at a 95% confidence level. The CreditMetrics model predicted the lowest economic capital values.
However, this outcome was due to several simplifications we had to make to circumvent the non-
availability of input data into this model.
                                          
9 We also obtained economic capital estimations according to the KMV model: CZK 50.9 bil. at the 95%
confidence level, CZK 71.99 bil. at the 99% confidence level, CZK 79.71 bil. at the 99.5% confidence level and
CZK 95.63 bil. at the 99.9% confidence level. These estimations are given here only for illustration, because in
implementing this model we strongly simplified some estimation techniques that are only briefly discussed in the
documents describing the KMV model. In any case, all the credit risk models’ estimations of economic capital
are comparable insofar as their rapport with regulatory capital is considered.36   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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The systemic focus was accomplished by considering Czech industries and estimating all the
required risk inputs at this level. In this sense the paper answered questions from a “macro”
lending view. Our results can be seen as an overall empirical assessment of the NBCA and of
several credit risk models analyzing the credit conditions in the Czech economy. On the other
hand this paper built upon prior research undertaken in the Czech National Bank on credit risk
modeling and can be seen as a reference for banks who are going to implement credit risk models
at a local level.Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   37
References
ARVANTIS, A., J. GREGORY, AND J.P. LAURENT (1999): “Building Models for Credit Spreads”.
Journal of Derivatives, 6(3), 27–43.
BANGIA, A., F.X. DIEBOLD, A. KRONIMUS, C. SCHAGEN,  AND  T. SCHUERMANN (2002):
“Ratings Migrations and the Business Cycle, With Application to Portfolio Stress
Testing”. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26 (2/3), 445–474.
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (January 2001): The New Basel Capital Accord.
Consultative Document, Bank for International Settlements.
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (October 2002): Quantitative Impact Study 3.
Technical Guidance, Bank for International Settlements.
CANTOR, R., AND E. FALKENSTEIN (2001): “Testing for Rating Consistency in Annual Default
Rates”. Journal of Fixed Income, September.
CORCOSTEGUI, C., L. GONZALES-MOSQUERA, A. MACELO,  AND  C. TRUCHARTE (2003):
“Analysis of Procyclical Effects on Capital Requirements Derived from a Rating System”.
BIS occasional paper.
CROUHY, M., D. GALAI, AND R. MARK (2000): “A Comparative Analysis of Current Credit Risk
Models”. Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, 59–117.
DERVIZ, A., AND  N. KADLCAKOVA (2001): “Methodological Problems of Credit Risk
Management in the Czech Economy”. CNB WP 39.
FALKENSTEIN, E., A. BORAL,  AND L.V. CARTY (2002): “RiskCalc
TM for Private Companies:
Moody’s Default Model”. Moody’s Investors Service – Rating Methodology.
JARROW, R.A., D. LANDO,  AND  S.M. TURNBULL (1997): “A Markov Model for the Term
Structure of Credit Risk Spreads”. The Review of Financial Studies, 10(2), 481–523.
JAFRY, Y., AND T. SCHUERMANN (2003): “Metrics for Comparing Credit Migration Matrices”.
Wharton Financial Institutions Working Paper, #03-08.
LANDO D., AND T. SKODEBERG (2000): “Analyzing Rating Transitions and Rating Drift with
Continuous Observations”. Journal of Banking and Finance, 26(2/3), 423–444.
NICKELL, P., W. PERRAUDIN,  AND  S. VAROTTO (2000): “Stability of Rating Transitions”.
Journal of Banking and Finance, 24, 203–227.
SCHUERMANN, T., AND Y. JAFRY (2003): “Measurement and Estimation of Credit Migration
Matrices”. Wharton Financial Institutions Working Paper, #03-09.
SCHWAIGER, W. (2003): “Konstruktion und Gute von Rating-Systemen”. in Eller/Gruber/Reif
(Hrsg.): Handbuch MAK, Schaeffer-Poeschl Verlag, Stuttgart.
SOBEHART J., S. KEENAN, AND R. STEIN (2000): “Validation Methodologies for Default Risk
Models”. Credit, 52.
SOBEHART, J., C.K. SEAN,  AND R. STEIN (2002): “Benchmarking Quantitative Default Risk
Models: A Validation Methodology”. Moody’s Investors Service – Rating Methodology.
STEIN, R.M. (2002): “Benchmarking Default Prediction Models: Pitfalls and Remedies in Model
Validation”. Moody’s KMV Technical Report #020305.38   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
Appendix
Appendix A1 – Migration Matrices
1.  1997–1998
1234567 8-PDs
1 33.33% 16.67% 50.00% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20 % 52.94% 26.47% 5.88% 8.82% 2.94% 0% 2.94%
3 0.15% 0.23% 82.39% 10.08% 1.73% 1.96% 0% 3.46%
4 0% 0.05% 9.77% 76.93% 3.99% 5.36% 0% 3.90%
5 0% 0% 2.32% 15.25% 72.97% 4.15% 0% 5.31%
6 0% 0% 3.41% 12.96% 7.97% 66.53% 0.25% 8.89%
7 0% 0% 3.33% 13.33% 3.33% 10.00% 53.33% 16.67%
8 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 100%
2.  1998–1999
1234567 8-PDs
1 70.00% 20.00% 0% 10.00% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2 1.08% 59.14% 16.13% 16.13% 3.23% 3.23% 0% 1.08%
3 0.08% 1.02% 74.96% 13.46% 5.20% 1.42% 0.08% 3.78%
4 0% 0.21% 4.71% 77.83% 8.83% 3.71% 0.03% 4.68%
5 0% 0.13% 0.56% 7.57% 82.05% 4.53% 0.07% 5.09%
6 0% 0.00% 0.63% 6.44% 15.21% 63.89% 0.63% 13.20%
7 0% 0.00% 0.00% 6.06% 9.09% 9.09% 51.52% 24.24%
8 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 100%
3.  1999–2000
1234567 8-PDs
1 60.00% 30.00% 0% 10.00% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2 0.18% 78.17% 9.91% 8.62% 2.02% 0.37% 0% 0.73%
3 0.07% 4.14% 79.72% 9.19% 3.93% 0.56% 0% 2.39%
4 0% 0.61% 3.06% 85.74% 6.45% 1.64% 0% 2.50%
5 0% 0.32% 0.91% 7.00% 86.22% 2.52% 0.03% 3.00%
6 0% 0% 0.53% 6.61% 15.72% 67.24% 0.53% 9.38%
7 0% 0% 0% 3.70% 11.11% 11.11% 59.26% 14.81%
8 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 100%
4.  2000–2001
1234567 8-PDs
1 50.00% 50.00% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
20 % 84.67% 10.00% 3.33% 1.33% 0% 0% 0.67%
3 0% 2.04% 82.94% 9.22% 2.78% 0.98% 0% 2.04%
4 0% 0.33% 4.19% 83.81% 7.08% 1.34% 0% 3.25%
5 0% 0.07% 1.20% 7.54% 83.19% 2.48% 0% 5.52%
6 0% 0.27% 0.91% 7.92% 12.83% 68.88% 0.09% 9.10%
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 9.68% 19.35% 45.16% 25.81%
8 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 100%Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   39
5.  2001–2002
1234567 8-PDs
1 80.65% 6.45% 9.68% 3.23% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2 13.79% 60.34% 18.97% 3.45% 0.00% 1.72% 0% 1.72%
3 0.73% 1.76% 71.30% 15.96% 6.42% 1.87% 0% 1.97%
4 0.13% 0.17% 5.78% 78.08% 8.92% 2.72% 0% 4.21%
5 0.04% 0.08% 1.43% 11.72% 75.95% 4.70% 0.04% 6.04%
6 0% 0% 1.61% 9.80% 15.22% 62.86% 0.12% 10.38%
7 0% 0% 0% 0% 12.50% 18.75% 50.00% 18.75%
8 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 100%
6.  Period average
1234567 8-PDs
1 58.80% 24.62% 11.94% 4.65% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2 3.01% 67.05% 16.29% 7.48% 3.08% 1.65% 0% 1.43%
3 0.20% 1.84% 78.26% 11.58% 4.01% 1.36% 0.02% 2.73%
4 0.03% 0.27% 5.50% 80.48% 7.05% 2.95% 0.01% 3.71%
5 0.01% 0.12% 1.28% 9.81% 80.08% 3.67% 0.03% 4.99%
6 0% 0.05% 1.42% 8.74% 13.39% 65.88% 0.32% 10.19%
7 0% 0.0% 0.67% 4.62% 9.14% 13.66% 51.85% 20.06%
8 0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 %0 % 100%





















1 2.41% 6.72% 2.30% 5.77% 3.67% 4.14% 604 25 0.81% 0.00% 5
2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 10.00% 4.88% 41 2 3.36% 3.40%
5 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 34 0 0.00% 0.54%
10 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 3.13% 32 1 3.08% 3.12%
11 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5 0 0.00% 0.49%
12 - - - - - 0.00% 0 0 0.00% 0.00%
13 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5 0 0.00% 0.49%
14 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.17% 11.11% 2.86% 105 3 1.63% 1.70% 4
15 8.52% 6.47% 8.78% 6.45% 7.33% 7.51% 1331 100 0.72% 0.88% 6
16 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 12 0 0.00% 0.50%
17 2.92% 6.10% 3.95% 4.14% 3.57% 4.22% 735 31 0.74% 0.89% 5
18 5.36% 2.50% 1.04% 6.45% 8.51% 4.11% 341 14 1.07% 1.19% 5
19 6.67% 10.00% 3.64% 12.82% 28.57% 10.60% 217 23 2.09% 2.15% 7
20 4.90% 10.29% 6.47% 6.98% 9.76% 7.73% 660 51 1.04% 1.15% 6
21 6.12% 5.26% 0.00% 4.69% 3.17% 3.56% 309 11 1.05% 1.16% 4
22 3.62% 6.25% 3.00% 3.73% 4.26% 4.17% 816 34 0.70% 0.86% 5
23 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.55% 22 1 4.44% 4.47%
24 1.98% 1.92% 2.20% 3.29% 6.14% 2.98% 705 21 0.64% 0.81% 4
25 3.66% 2.58% 3.28% 3.62% 3.98% 3.39% 1093 37 0.55% 0.74% 4
26 5.17% 7.75% 3.73% 4.20% 3.79% 4.90% 694 34 0.82% 0.96% 540   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
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27 3.64% 8.70% 2.67% 8.11% 6.85% 6.07% 346 21 1.28% 1.38% 6
28 5.19% 5.06% 2.50% 4.41% 5.37% 4.36% 2131 93 0.44% 0.67% 5
29 5.07% 6.03% 4.40% 2.67% 5.75% 4.72% 1378 65 0.57% 0.76% 5
30 7.14% 5.26% 2.63% 0.00% 15.63% 5.41% 148 8 1.86% 1.93% 6
31 3.33% 1.42% 1.64% 3.55% 3.33% 2.59% 733 19 0.59% 0.77% 3
32 4.65% 2.70% 5.41% 2.11% 2.56% 3.49% 401 14 0.92% 1.05% 4
33 7.50% 0.00% 4.62% 5.56% 1.75% 3.65% 274 10 1.13% 1.24% 4
34 0.00% 1.69% 1.49% 1.52% 1.47% 1.29% 310 4 0.64% 0.81% 2
35 12.50% 52.94% 0.00% 10.00% 9.52% 14.85% 101 15 3.54% 3.57%
36 2.52% 7.48% 2.27% 5.63% 8.40% 5.12% 703 36 0.83% 0.97% 6
37 0.00% 0.00% 4.55% 6.67% 6.67% 3.37% 89 3 1.91% 1.98% 4
40 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.57% 2.80% 143 4 1.38% 1.46% 4
41 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 79 0 0.00% 0.50% 1
45 7.45% 6.32% 2.17% 6.60% 7.93% 5.58% 2744 153 0.44% 0.67% 6
50 4.90% 3.41% 2.34% 8.89% 4.35% 4.45% 742 33 0.76% 0.91% 5
51 6.15% 7.91% 4.20% 4.83% 5.77% 5.70% 7419 423 0.27% 0.56% 6
52 5.61% 6.43% 2.30% 6.53% 5.07% 4.87% 5214 254 0.30% 0.59% 5
55 2.38% 11.59% 1.71% 6.98% 10.00% 5.79% 311 18 1.32% 1.43% 6
60 2.68% 3.29% 1.13% 2.62% 3.06% 2.39% 1420 34 0.41% 0.66% 3
61 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 50.00% 6.67% 15 1 6.44% 6.46%
62 33.33% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 22.22% 9 2 13.86% 13.87%
63 5.13% 1.32% 2.17% 2.82% 0.00% 1.99% 351 7 0.75% 0.90% 3
64 11.11% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 1.89% 106 2 1.32% 1.42% 3
65 15.22% 12.00% 6.78% 7.69% 10.81% 10.25% 244 25 1.94% 2.00% 7
66 0.00% 0.00% 14.29% 0.00% 12.50% 5.56% 36 2 3.82% 3.85%
67 13.04% 2.44% 0.00% 4.00% 13.64% 4.91% 163 8 1.69% 1.77% 5
70 7.48% 6.84% 9.35% 8.25% 13.54% 8.99% 556 50 1.21% 1.31% 6
71 13.04% 0.00% 5.88% 4.35% 0.00% 4.80% 125 6 1.91% 1.98% 5
72 1.35% 2.17% 1.08% 1.35% 1.61% 1.45% 898 13 0.40% 0.66% 3
73 0.00% 8.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.41% 71 1 1.40% 1.48%
74 6.60% 6.03% 4.06% 5.54% 6.60% 5.59% 1843 103 0.54% 0.73% 6Credit Risk and Bank Lending in the Czech Republic   41
Appendix A3 – Credit Exposure at the Industry Level (mil. CZK)
CZK EURO USD NACE
<1 y 1–4 y 4–5 y >5 y <1 y 1–4 y 4–5 y >5 y <1 y 1–4 y 4–5 y >5 y
1 3188.22 2327.18 1507.14 7505.96 3.48 33.58 0.00 193.32 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 482.11 124.19 235.18 461.57 28.31 61.69 11.38 69.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 11537.33 3426.25 2978.05 3924.17 252.90 3.82 12.59 64.04 36.94 1.51 0.00 0.00
17 2282.79 378.25 200.29 376.48 1001.17 572.72 114.99 1401.99 40.81 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 875.00 645.29 94.82 298.92 306.16 51.20 90.28 101.00 9.20 13.24 0.00 0.00
19 190.09 120.13 73.44 48.89 9.05 0.00 12.27 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 476.91 138.66 222.28 468.87 402.73 23.79 72.74 248.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 2599.57 1021.57 72.69 1621.08 327.69 982.76 12.64 369.23 26.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 2011.90 347.79 340.56 1709.13 50.79 0.00 55.11 74.81 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 8450.27 946.53 420.17 1773.87 1013.81 806.53 253.54 429.80 19.87 34.37 0.00 0.00
25 3283.63 636.72 379.76 737.69 1209.62 1070.70 165.30 400.95 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 6033.56 1090.20 1451.39 1261.81 2701.02 754.29 83.59 688.90 0.01 0.00 0.00 72.69
27 1606.69 758.92 444.10 1939.05 342.02 50.28 36.33 305.51 5.11 3.06 0.00 0.00
28 2857.57 714.36 553.22 1746.32 852.03 266.54 271.10 859.54 80.35 10.05 0.00 0.00
29 4451.32 1350.37 671.98 1306.54 2476.76 541.31 223.80 589.58 1058.21 177.4 70.97 0.00
30 71.39 28.57 10.34 35.00 16.79 0.00 0.00 6.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
31 2358.56 324.60 166.59 1587.57 321.37 367.47 35.79 327.83 12.42 165.2 0.00 0.00
32 389.38 82.12 12.44 16.48 181.81 55.37 0.00 40.81 2.53 38.68 0.00 0.00
33 619.45 129.83 155.02 198.66 12.70 2.14 4.94 21.92 1.13 40.05 0.00 0.00
34 4601.89 1749.95 57.06 321.46 170.60 123.11 117.98 165.59 22.39 0.20 0.00 0.00
36 1537.35 362.56 227.81 689.11 1104.17 164.84 140.26 169.45 96.18 8.17 5.22 121.46
37 351.58 107.35 15.66 95.73 46.57 19.06 0.00 3.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 3252.47 2668.09 2180.46 13383.21 114.37 215.80 0.00 1241.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 1847.4
41 461.19 180.69 567.56 1458.68 0.01 33.18 35.39 13.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
45 4709.11 1312.41 521.92 1864.19 41.63 566.21 2.86 775.74 0.03 9.61 4.32 0.00
50 4353.39 1257.93 168.06 3488.94 59.91 8.32 11.29 17.13 187.75 24.82 0.00 0.00
51 30810.67 6530.09 2830.13 9345.83 1778.72 1689.39 485.69 1044.68 461.08 388.0 167.26 1001.7
52 11253.11 3741.20 1650.55 2842.24 171.80 58.79 15.88 223.09 27.68 6.71 6.27 0.00
55 349.93 168.73 139.42 1043.14 80.79 7.15 15.18 401.23 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
60 3493.21 1243.34 1618.34 8957.58 92.49 154.05 57.11 825.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
63 1169.36 80.00 210.96 515.63 24.04 2.50 0.00 1339.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
64 2227.442 1347.53 72.594 3796.894 1062.95 1308.76 0.00 837.28 20.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
65 2568.00 1450.03 28.06 721.36 172.73 0.00 2.34 0.00 24.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
67 6.59 148.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
70 3335.61 2412.77 428.47 9044.96 1961.42 691.33 657.18 17775.9 21.65 0.00 0.00 361.62
71 3432.69 5758.02 1041.64 1615.74 201.73 517.55 97.67 337.97 2.95 0.00 0.00 0.00
72 1051.75 646.67 186.46 736.68 17.01 0.00 0.00 34.03 371.94 0.00 0.00 0.00
73 90.29 8.33 246.88 21.45 0.01 0.00 0.00 6.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.41
74 10511.09 2814.36 582.73 4716.85 1252.92 105.11 165.77 512.69 794.59 12.03 0.00 3.6142   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
Appendix A4 – Loan Interest Rates at the Industry Level
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Appendix A5 – Asset Return Correlations
NACE 1 1 41 51 71 82 02 12 22 42 52 6
1 1.00
14 -0.77 1.00
15 0.49 0.01 1.00
17 0.56 -0.60 0.15 1.00
18 0.06 -0.31 -0.10 0.53 1.00
20 0.20 -0.10 0.28 0.68 0.55 1.00
21 0.26 -0.66 -0.59 0.25 0.23 -0.13 1.00
22 0.61 -0.88 -0.02 0.60 0.62 0.27 0.53 1.00
24 0.23 -0.57 -0.51 0.05 -0.17 -0.30 0.73 0.35 1.00
25 0.55 -0.52 0.25 0.88 0.30 0.68 0.14 0.47 0.05 1.00
26 -0.77 0.90 -0.06 -0.76 -0.25 -0.37 -0.52 -0.76 -0.51 -0.69 1.00
27 0.70 -0.68 0.17 0.89 0.36 0.61 0.38 0.62 0.20 0.77 -0.85
28 -0.21 0.51 0.49 0.17 0.27 0.55 -0.71 -0.26 -0.86 0.26 0.38
29 -0.15 0.28 0.38 0.27 0.41 0.64 -0.66 0.03 -0.64 0.32 0.13
30 0.39 -0.56 -0.05 0.88 0.51 0.64 0.21 0.61 0.17 0.77 -0.72
31 0.43 -0.73 -0.24 0.76 0.47 0.39 0.51 0.73 0.44 0.62 -0.77
32 0.42 -0.38 0.34 0.77 0.47 0.75 -0.21 0.52 -0.14 0.71 -0.59
33 -0.56 0.65 -0.17 -0.01 -0.10 0.15 -0.37 -0.64 -0.43 0.02 0.48
34 0.62 -0.79 0.11 0.82 0.72 0.55 0.36 0.91 0.17 0.66 -0.79
36 0.12 -0.36 0.07 0.42 0.72 0.42 -0.05 0.66 -0.06 0.30 -0.31
37 -0.07 -0.37 -0.45 0.01 0.54 -0.08 0.46 0.57 0.42 -0.24 -0.19
40 -0.56 0.36 -0.36 -0.56 0.05 -0.47 -0.04 -0.27 -0.24 -0.70 0.54
41 -0.77 0.86 -0.13 -0.89 -0.38 -0.48 -0.44 -0.77 -0.35 -0.81 0.96
45 -0.15 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.47 0.73 -0.56 -0.09 -0.59 0.27 0.09
50 -0.65 0.75 -0.18 -0.91 -0.60 -0.66 -0.29 -0.80 -0.13 -0.78 0.86
51 -0.67 0.94 0.10 -0.73 -0.38 -0.28 -0.60 -0.86 -0.55 -0.62 0.94
55 -0.73 0.92 -0.04 -0.76 -0.39 -0.32 -0.50 -0.85 -0.44 -0.61 0.93
60 -0.74 0.91 -0.02 -0.77 -0.35 -0.38 -0.53 -0.82 -0.50 -0.71 0.97
64 -0.73 0.90 -0.14 -0.61 -0.46 -0.21 -0.44 -0.90 -0.34 -0.45 0.82
70 0.24 -0.15 0.31 0.50 0.24 0.53 -0.18 0.21 -0.15 0.54 -0.30
71 0.20 -0.25 0.07 0.34 0.17 0.19 0.11 0.25 0.10 0.31 -0.26
72 -0.57 0.77 0.07 -0.67 -0.40 -0.36 -0.48 -0.72 -0.38 -0.56 0.82
74 -0.30 0.45 0.17 -0.41 -0.25 -0.19 -0.35 -0.39 -0.24 -0.31 0.5044   Narcisa Kadlčáková,
 Joerg Keplinger
Asset Return Correlations – continue














29 0.05 0.81 1.00
30 0.76 0.07 0.37 1.00
31 0.71 -0.25 0.04 0.91 1.00
32 0.64 0.38 0.67 0.84 0.60 1.00
33 -0.20 0.48 0.32 0.00 -0.24 -0.09 1.00
34 0.77 -0.01 0.24 0.81 0.81 0.74 -0.43 1.00
36 0.23 0.21 0.60 0.59 0.52 0.68 -0.26 0.71 1.00
37 0.03 -0.43 -0.07 0.20 0.39 0.05 -0.41 0.42 0.60 1.00
40 -0.60 -0.10 -0.18 -0.51 -0.40 -0.52 0.06 -0.39 -0.12 0.25 1.00
41 -0.91 0.19 -0.02 -0.82 -0.82 -0.69 0.37 -0.86 -0.38 -0.12 0.58
45 0.17 0.75 0.81 0.35 0.02 0.60 0.42 0.22 0.41 -0.11 -0.19
50 -0.87 -0.03 -0.28 -0.87 -0.80 -0.82 0.31 -0.93 -0.59 -0.23 0.46
51 -0.77 0.43 0.12 -0.77 -0.87 -0.57 0.51 -0.84 -0.46 -0.39 0.42
55 -0.82 0.35 0.06 -0.77 -0.84 -0.63 0.52 -0.88 -0.47 -0.35 0.42
60 -0.80 0.33 0.07 -0.76 -0.83 -0.61 0.49 -0.84 -0.42 -0.26 0.53
64 -0.68 0.32 0.03 -0.60 -0.70 -0.53 0.64 -0.87 -0.53 -0.45 0.31
70 0.43 0.34 0.43 0.47 0.28 0.58 0.06 0.38 0.32 -0.15 -0.47
71 0.32 0.01 0.08 0.29 0.26 0.26 -0.05 0.30 0.20 0.04 -0.29
72 -0.69 0.27 0.02 -0.71 -0.76 -0.55 0.37 -0.76 -0.40 -0.31 0.33
















Asset Return Correlations – continue

























50 0.93 -0.28 1.00
51 0.93 0.18 0.86 1.00
55 0.93 0.09 0.89 0.96 1.00
60 0.96 0.07 0.88 0.96 0.92 1.00
64 0.81 0.12 0.79 0.86 0.91 0.81 1.00
70 -0.40 0.40 -0.47 -0.28 -0.30 -0.32 -0.21 1.00
71 -0.31 0.06 -0.31 -0.29 -0.29 -0.27 -0.24 0.88 1.00
72 0.81 0.02 0.78 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.12 0.24 1.00
74 0.48 0.02 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.62 0.88 1
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